Forging signed commits on GitHub

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A half-year ago, I found a bug in an internal GitHub API that let me trick the internal API into signing commits as any user. So I could create a commit signed by a user I don’t control:

A signed commit authored by @octocat with message “signed from codespace” and date Dec 31 2029

Before I explain how I did that, first some context on how Git commit signing works:

Git commit internals

Git commits are stored in a custom text-based format that looks like:

tree 55ca6286e3e4f4fba5d0448333fa99fc5a404a73
parent 7676f1f3b526f05b530a3566211dab5a5225af9a
author loops <> 1678388328 -0500
committer loops <> 1678388328 -0500

Commit message

Signed commits have a extra gpgsig header that has a signature over every line in the commit except the gpgsig itself:

tree be0788944df13c5d170e050f2fe178360c3df5a5
author loops <> 1678388328 -0500
committer loops <> 1678388328 -0500
gpgsig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Legitimate signed commit

When you create a commit on, it is signed with GitHub’s web flow GPG key and has a committer of GitHub <>. Web-flow signed commits are shown as signed in the GitHub UI:

This commit was created on and signed with GitHub’s verified signature

If we can trick GitHub into signing a commit with any author, we can create forged commits that GitHub shows as signed.

Tricking an internal API endpoint into signing our commits

For some context, I learned how some GitHub internals work by downloading a GitHub Enterprise Server trial VM and deobfuscating the Ruby source code on the VM.

GitHub Codespaces is a GitHub service that provides you with a development environment in the cloud. One feature of Codespaces is that commits created in it are signed with the web flow GPG key (if enabled in settings).

When a commit is created in a codespace with GPG signing enabled, this happens:

  1. git checks the gpg.program config option, which is set to /.codespaces/bin/gh-gpgsign
  2. git calls /.codespaces/bin/gh-gpgsign with the raw commit body
  3. The gh-gpgsign binary (which is closed-source) makes an API request to with the commit body
  4. gh-gpgsign returns the signature returned from the API
  5. git inserts the commit signature into the commit data

The /vscs_internal/commit/sign endpoint is interesting because you can give it arbitrary raw commit data, and get a signature back.

That /vscs_internal/commit/sign endpoint checked that the author line in the provided commit data is valid by finding the first line that matches the regex /\Aauthor (.+?) <(.+)>/, and ensuring the name and email extracted from that regex corresponded to the logged-in user. But this regex doesn’t match author lines with 0-length names! So for this commit:

tree 251966888982546b81f8bfc8de1f25077f099a56
parent fb5ce469856769a17cca88ec4e2c6159d4669b21
author  <> 1682188800 +0000
committer GitHub <> 1682188800 +0000
author username <> 1682188800 +0000

commit message

Since the first author name is zero characters long, the regex skips that line, and the fake second author line is used instead. Git ignores extra author lines after the first, so Codespaces looks at the second author line but Git looks at the first. This means we can create GitHub-signed commits with any author name+email.

The fix

GitHub fixed the issue by changing the problematic regex to /\Aauthor ([^<]*)[ ]{0,1}<(.+)>/, which should all author header lines accepted by git-fsck.


  • April 22 2023: I report the issue to GitHub
  • April 24 2023: GitHub closes the issue, saying that being able to impersonate your own account is not an issue
  • April 24 2023: I respond saying that you can use this to attack impersonate other people
  • May 2 2023: I respond again, demonstrating that the issue still works
  • May 4 2023: GitHub reopens the issue
  • May 17 2023: GitHub validates the issue and begins work on a fix
  • June 2023: GitHub fixes the issue on
  • June 23 2023: GitHub closes the issue and rewards me with $10000